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Accountability Bargains in Pakistan 




Poor and marginalised citizens rarely engage directly with the state to solve their 
governance issues in fragile, conflict and violence-affected settings, as these 
settings are characterised by the confrontational nature of state–citizen relations. 
Instead, citizens engage with, and make claims to, intermediaries some of them 
public authorities in their own right. What are these intermediaries’ roles, and 
which strategies and practices do they use to broker state–citizen engagement? 
We argue that in Pakistan intermediaries make themselves essential by: (1) being 
able to speak the language of public authorities; (2) constantly creating and 
sustaining networks outside their communities; and (3) building collectivising 
power by maintaining reciprocity relations with their communities. In doing so, 
households and intermediaries engage in what we are calling ‘accountability 
bargains’1: strategies and practices intermediaries and poor and marginalised 
households employ in order to gain a greater degree of security and autonomy 
within the bounds of class, religious, and ethnic oppression.  
By accepting the system and nurturing personalistic accountability relations 
instead of developing systematic ones, intermediaries make poor peoples’ lives 
less difficult in the short term, while reinforcing a system of oppression. The 
decision by all to conform to the demands of an unjust system in order to gain 
some individual benefit is not new, accountability bargains are as entrenched in 
local governance systems as the historical mistrust of the state. While these 
governance networks and the distribution of public authority appear quite 
durable, often with deep historical roots that can be traced back to the colonial 
era (Gilmartin 1994), we also see instances of dynastic mediation being 
contested and challenged by newer intermediaries. 
Keywords 




1  Borrowing from Kandiyoti’s (1988) ‘patriarchal bargain’. 
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Chronically poor and marginalised citizens rarely engage directly with the state to 
solve their governance issues in fragile, conflict and violence-affected settings 
(FCVAS), as these settings are characterised by the confrontational nature of 
state–citizen relations. Instead, they engage with and make claims to 
intermediaries, some of them public authorities in their own right. Who are these 
intermediaries, and which strategies and practices do they use to broker state–
citizen engagement? In the Governance at the Margins project, part of the Action 
for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA)2 programme and the focus of this 
paper, we studied the role that intermediaries play in mediating state–citizen 
relations and helping people to solve their problems in contexts of fragility, 
conflict and violence in Africa and Asia. We developed it as a follow-up to the 
Governance Diaries project (the first phase of this research). In the Governance 
Diaries we aimed at understanding the meanings of empowerment and 
accountability from the point of view of chronically poor and marginalised people 
and how that changes over time based on their experiences with governance.3 
We used Eyben, Kabeer and Cornwall’s (2008: 6) work as a starting point as we 
tried to conceptualise empowerment: not only when they argue that 
empowerment is all about power – the power to redefine possibilities and 
options, and to act on them – but also its subjective element, ‘when individuals 
and organised groups are able to imagine their world differently and to realise 
that vision by changing the relations of power that have been keeping them in 
poverty’. We conceptualise empowerment as both an action or process – the act 
of gaining power and control over decisions and resources that affects lives – as 
well as a state of being (objective and subjective), where people have a greater 
voice over decision-making that affects their lives that allows them to expand 
their choices (as well as the possibility of making those choices), and that 
eventually gives them increased control over their own lives. We used Schedler’s 
(1999) conceptualisation of accountability as a broad two-way relationship 
between two parties A and B, denoting both answerability and enforcement: 
where answerability is A’s obligation to inform and justify its actions to B; and 
enforcement is B’s capacity to sanction or reward A for its actions. In this paper, 
answerability is framed as an intermediary’s obligation to inform and justify their 
actions to poor and marginalised households, and enforcement is the 
households’ capacity to sanction or reward the intermediary for their actions. 
 
2  Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) is a five-year research programme (2016–21) which 
seeks to understand how social and political action can contribute to empowerment and accountability in 
FCVAS. 
3  See Loureiro et al. (2020) for our conceptualisation of ‘chronically poor and marginalised households’ 
and ‘public authority’. 
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In this project, Governance at the Margins, we followed intermediary individuals, 
roles, or organisations empirically identified from the first phase. In the initial set 
of fieldwork our respondents – chronically poor and marginalised households – 
all pointed out the role of governance intermediaries to whom they always go to 
for help when they need to contact public authorities. By governance 
intermediaries we mean people who for diverse reasons are approached by, and 
play a mediating role between, chronically poor and marginalised citizens and 
public authorities. This role may be more or less formal or institutionalised. For 
the purposes of the research, we were interested in intermediaries with some 
distance from the person seeking assistance, so this excluded family members 
who might play an ad hoc mediation role for some people. There are many 
layers of potential intermediation in a governance chain. We were specifically 
interested in the closest link to ordinary people – their ‘first port of call’ in trying to 
address a governance issue.  
Although many different terms are used to describe the kind of processes that 
we are studying, the one that works best is mediation. This has two meanings, 
as it can refer both to connecting citizens and public authorities, and to resolving 
disputes among citizens. As the examples we explore include many episodes 
where intermediaries’ role is about dispute resolution, this second meaning also 
seems appropriate. The literature identifies a range of concepts that are used to 
analyse both the process of mediation and its outcomes. In this paper we focus 
on the process of mediation – that we analyse in our discussion of local 
governance systems, as well as strategies and practices – and its outcome 
regarding accountability relations. 
Using a Governance Diaries approach (Loureiro et al. 2020), from November 
2019 to December 2020 we followed a set of intermediaries with bimonthly 
interviews in four locations in Pakistan. Two of the locations were in informal 
settlements or katchi abadis4 in Islamabad, one where there is an active conflict 
between residents and the local authorities over land use, the other where the 
conflict has subsided over the years. The other two locations were in Punjab, 
one a village where there is an active conflict between residents and the state 
over land ownership, the other peri-urban where there is no active conflict with 
public authorities.  
We started with 20 intermediaries, roughly divided across the four locations. 
While we only managed to conduct most of the planned interviews with about 
half of these, we did still carry out a significant number of interviews with those 
remaining (ranging from one to four interviews). The first three interviews were 
 
4  In this paper we choose to call these locations katchi abadis. Not only is this the name our respondents 
use, but also all the alternative terms are negatively defined by a lack of: lack of formal planning 
(informal settlement), lack of land tenure (squatter settlement), lack of water and sanitation (slum) – and 
yet they are so tightly integrated economically, spatially, and socially with their urban contexts that the 
lack of katchi abadis would make these cities unsustainable to live in (Dovey and King 2011). 
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conducted as planned, but when Covid-19 emerged and Pakistan went into 
lockdown on 21 March 2020, we switched our physical visits and interviews to 
phone and voice over IP services.5 The Covid-19 pandemic and the associated 
government-decreed lockdown gave us an opportunity to witness how 
intermediaries across different locations dealt with the same crisis: how they 
interacted with citizens and public authorities, their roles, practices and 
strategies, and how they make themselves essential to the functioning of the 
local governance systems. 
We argue that intermediaries make themselves essential by: (1) being able to 
speak the language of public authorities, (2) constantly creating and sustaining 
networks outside their communities (physically and online), and (3) building 
collectivising power by maintaining reciprocity relations with their communities 
(‘I solve your problems, you give me numbers’). In doing so households, 
intermediaries, and the state engage in what we are calling ‘accountability 
bargains’. Joshi and Fox (2017) characterise accountability bargains as explicit 
engagements of embedded social groups (seen as legitimate by public 
authorities) which may occur through formal or informal channels, traditional (e.g. 
panchayats – village councils) or non-traditional (social media), and enabled by 
alliances across institutional and social/class lines around issues of immediate 
concern. According to Joshi and Fox, if bargains hold, they can lead to virtuous 
cycles of improved levels of trust and accountability. Yet, because these 
bargains are fragile – evolving in contexts of uncertainty and tenuousness – they 
require constant engagement to be kept alive. We take this concept a step 
further and, borrowing from Kandiyoti’s (1988) ‘patriarchal bargains’, redefine it 
as the strategies and practices intermediaries and poor and marginalised 
households employ to gain a greater degree of security and autonomy within the 
bounds of class, religious, and ethnic oppression.6 By accepting the system and 
nurturing personalistic accountability relations, instead of developing systematic 
accountability relations, intermediaries make households’ lives less difficult in the 
short term, while reinforcing a system of oppression. In other words, there is an 
individual gain, but a collective loss. 
The decision by all parties to conform to the demands of the system in order to 
gain some individual benefit is not new: accountability bargains are as 
entrenched in local governance systems as the historical mistrust of the state. 
And while these governance networks and the distribution of public authority 
appear quite durable, often with deep historical roots that can be traced back to 
the colonial era (Gilmartin 1994), we see instances of it being contested and 
 
5  The increased flurry of activity in all intermediaries’ lives – as they were essential in assisting citizens 
and public authorities in navigating the first lockdown, both dealing with the hazard (pandemic) and 
peoples’ loss of livelihoods – meant many of them did not have the time or patience to talk to us. 
6  On the other side of the interface, that between intermediaries and public authorities, we posit that these 
bargains would resemble Tendler’s (2002) ‘devil’s deal’. 
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challenged by newer intermediaries. Accountability bargains are deeply 
embedded in the social structures of Punjab: they happen through caste-like 
politics, dynastic mediation, and reciprocity relations. As such, context is 
essential to understand and unpack intermediaries’ strategies and practices 
when helping poor and marginalised households in FCVAS access public 
authority, make claims, demand justifications. Where many practices and 
strategies of intermediation are common across societies – such as speaking the 
language of the state, networking, and collectivising – these are strongly 
embedded not only in the local governance systems but also in its vernacular. 
Possibly because of this entrenchment, these practices and strategies do not 
challenge the system, but instead perpetuate it. 
This paper is divided into five parts. Following this introduction, we describe 
some of the key intermediaries involved in this study, the different local 
governance systems where they operate, and highlight some of the key 
characteristics that make them intermediaries. In section 3 we explain how 
intermediaries make themselves essential using a set of strategies to solve 
people’s problems in their locations. The three most common are: speaking the 
language of public authorities, constantly networking outside their locations, and 
building collectivising power. Within the last one, we highlight the importance for 
intermediaries to maintain reciprocity relations – through accountability bargains 
– with ‘their’ people as a way of gaining legitimacy in their role. In section 4 we 
show that the different local governance systems where intermediaries operate 
are actually the networks they are composed of, and that their thickness helps us 
explain both the nature of the accountability relations between households and 
intermediaries and the diversity across locations. How thick or thin the 
connections are within these networks is related to the locations’ historical 
structures, including the strength of parallel governance systems to that of the 
state, the history of conflict, and level of political competition amongst 
intermediaries. We show how two networks in particular, the biradari7 and 
dynastic mediation, are used in accountability bargains. We conclude in section 
5, highlighting three interconnected observations regarding intermediaries and 
accountability relations: that accountability needs to be understood in relation to 
citizens’ expectations relative to public authorities, that both citizens’ and 
authorities’ expectations of who should be accountable to whom is influenced by 
intermediaries, and that individual accountability relations on their own do not 
advance the accountability of the system. 
 
7  Caste-like kinship group. 
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2. Who are the intermediaries? 
The intermediaries in our study do not have a common profile. There are some 
similarities, inasmuch as the overwhelming majority are men who became 
intermediaries in their early 20s, despite being of different ages during our 
research. There is also a clear distinction between locations, with all 
intermediaries in Punjab being born and living where they operate 
(autochthonous) and inheriting their role from their fathers (dynastic). On the 
other side of the spectrum, the Islamabad locations are more recent,8 with all 
residents migrating between 15 to 30+ years ago to the conflict and non-conflict 
locations respectively, and only one intermediary having inherited his role from 
his forefathers.9 Many of the similarities and differences in the intermediaries 
relate to their individual characteristics. These are connected to their personality 
(courage, generosity…), their abilities (persuasiveness, political cunning…), their 
identity (gender, religion, ethnicity…), their resources (money, land, education, 
kinship/other networks…), and their history (dynastic intermediation, record of 
military service or government office…). Political party membership is especially 
important because unlike other collective bodies, political parties can take the 
role of governing beyond the community level and therefore provide a stronger 
link between communities and public authority. In multi-party contexts there is a 
greater number of intermediaries and more competition among them, as helping 
to solve local people’s problems is a valuable way of securing political support.10 
Party-based mediation can be disrupted by a change in who holds power at the 
city, provincial or national level, with incoming governments refusing to engage 
with the mediation efforts of intermediaries who are linked to the previous ruling 
party. 
 
8  The capital itself was built in 1960. 
9  Most residents in the conflict location resettled from a village in Punjab where they fell victims of a 
religious pogrom. This intermediary had already been their community head there. 
10  For a good overview on the role of intermediaries as political brokers in the subcontinent, see the edited 
volumes by Price and Ruud (2010) and Piliavsky (2014). 
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Table 1.1 Intermediaries’ main features 










Baba Gilli Male > 50 Christian Yes > 10 Opposition party – 
Haseeb Male < 35 Sunni – < 5 Left-wing party Yes 
Talha Male < 35 Shia – < 5 Left-wing party – 
Pastor 
Shamshad 




Zayan Male > 50 Christian Yes 5-10 Left-wing party – 
Jon Male 35-50 Christian – < 5 – Yes 
Pastor Amanat Male < 35 Christian – 5-10 – – 
Paul Male > 50 Sunni – 5-10 Opposition party – 
Punjab 
(conflict) 
Amir Male 35-50 Sunni Yes > 10 
Ruling party and 
tenants’ association 
Yes 
Aapa Female > 50 Sunni Yes > 10 Tenants’ association Yes 
Arshad Male 35-50 Sunni Yes > 10 Tenants’ association Yes 
Siraj Male < 35 Sunni Yes 5-10 Rival association Yes 




Rayan Male 35-50 Sunni Yes > 10 Ruling party Yes 
Nawaz Male < 35 Sunni Yes 5-10 Religious party Yes 
Doctor Male > 50 Sunni Yes > 10 Religious party Yes 
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While at first glance an important differentiation between intermediaries appears 
to be the formality of their role, in reality this distinction is not that clear: whether 
a role is formal or informal is often ambiguous or contested. For instance, a 
religious or traditional leader can be seen by members of their group as having a 
formal role, but not be recognised in this way by government; an opposing 
political party can refuse to recognise the formal role of government-appointed 
intermediaries; or people who participated in a meeting to establish a community 
association can consider it formally established by that meeting, but local officials 
can refuse to recognise it as a formal organisation until it has been registered 
with a specific government office. Some intermediaries have authority at the 
neighbourhood or village level, which may be conferred by the government, by 
the neighbourhood/village (often a specific group within), or by both. This 
authority status gives intermediaries an important role in mediating disputes11 
that occur within the locations as well as in organising local self-provision, 
whereas other intermediaries only mediate between local people and actors 
outside the location, rather than claiming the right to decide on 
neighbourhood/village-level issues. A few intermediaries operate as individuals 
while most use a collective identity in their mediation work. This collective identity 
can refer to a community-based organisation (such as the tenants’ association in 
Punjab) or to a structure established by an external authority (such as the 
Corona Relief Tiger Force). In some cases, intermediaries operate as individuals 
but their membership of a collective body (such as a social movement, a political 
party, or a government body like the CDA12 in Islamabad) is what makes the 
mediation role possible, because their contacts with actors beyond the 
community are made through this body. 
A common trait across all locations is the centrality of land in conflict. Yet, there 
are differences related to the intensity, main actors involved, and what people 
are actually contesting for. While in Islamabad residents are fighting with the 
city’s administration for their right to settle, in Punjab people are fighting the 
armed forces and retired officers for their right to land they claim is theirs. This is 
explained in more detail in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
All our intermediaries in Punjab are also panchayat members in their locations. 
Panchayat membership is usually reserved to groups of village elders and other 
local influentials. Despite all our respondents stating that panchayats are not as 
active as they used to be, again and again we learn from their interviews that 
most of the issues are being dealt with by panchayat members in Punjab and 
elders in both Islamabad and Punjab. Chaudhry and Chaudhry (2010) also 
record panchayats as becoming less powerful than power brokers – which they 
call deraydar13 – in rural Pakistan’s power structure. In other words, it appears 
 
11  Dispute resolution is one of the main services demanded by Pakistani citizens (Acemoglu et al. 2020). 
12  Capital Development Authority. 
13  From dera, the men’s room, where men of the village gather to discuss village affairs. 
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there is a trend developing where panchayat membership matters more than the 
panchayat itself. Still, the role of elders and panchayats is very important, and 
most issues are still resolved through them, using ‘a combination of mediation, 
compromise, and penalties, including social ostracism, boycott, and sometimes 
even physical retaliation’ (Acemoglu et al. 2020: 3098). To enforce panchayat 
decisions, members and the overall community make use of sanctions and 
penalty fees. While in Punjab we see penalty fees attached to people who 
transgress the decisions made by the elders and panchayat, in Islamabad we do 
not see any mechanism that can ensure compliance to the decision. For 
instance, when one intermediary, Baba Gilli, as the elder of the location decided 
to install water pumps to provide water for free and people started selling it, he 
had no power to enforce his decision. In Islamabad, although respect of elders 
and religious figures is very important that does not mean people will not disobey 
their decisions, as if they disobey the only likely penalty is that they will be 
disliked by the community. 
2.1 Intermediaries in Islamabad 
There are 52 katchi abadis in Islamabad with more than 200,000 people living 
there. One third of the residents – the largest group – belongs to the country’s 
Christian minority. These katchi abadis are densely populated urban areas with 
substandard living, inadequate infrastructure and services, with sewage water 
overflowing nearby, and lack of tenure security. Of the 52, the local government 
(CDA) only recognises ten as legal, which means that there is constant conflict 
over the right to live in these settlements, with CDA and the police pitted against 
the residents. The two locations we researched fall under the 42 non-recognised 
katchi abadis: one is an older (about 30 years old) more congested location, 
where conflict with the state has diminished, while the other is more recent and is 
therefore bearing much more of the brunt of anti-encroachment drives. In this 
conflict location, residents had escaped from a pogrom in their villages after a 
Christian woman was accused of blasphemy. The area of the katchi abadi was 
largely a forest when they arrived, so the households removed all the plants and 
trees. With a winter season looming, they started to build shelters on their own. 
That is how gradually they made an abadi as a community, without any help 
from other people or public authorities. 
In the older, non-conflict location members of the Christian community migrated 
from various areas of the country. The first settlers lived in tents covered with 
plastics. Slowly and gradually, amid fights with the CDA, people succeeded in 
making their settlement permanent against all odds. The government stance is 
that the land belongs to the government and these people are illegal occupants. 
Residents in Islamabad katchi abadis state that they do not have any other place 
to go, and the state must provide shelter to them. The major issue in the 
Islamabad locations is the haphazard way that the CDA harasses residents. 
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They either come at any time to demolish the residents’ shelters in what they call 
anti-encroachment drives, or individuals within the CDA come to take money 
from the residents with the promise of not demolishing their abodes that day. To 
assist the Islamabad katchi abadi residents, a left-wing party (described below) 
filed a case in the Supreme Court saying that until these people were provided 
with alternative homes, their houses could not be demolished. The Supreme 
Court granted a stay order and since then incidents of harassment have 
reduced. While over the last year we did not record any major CDA action in 
either location, the situation is still quite volatile. For instance, when we started 
our research in 2017 the location we selected as ‘non-conflict’ had not been part 
of any anti-encroachment drive by the CDA for over a decade;14 in 2019, the 
situation flipped and suddenly there was a CDA anti-encroachment drive in the 
non-conflict location and nothing in the conflict location. 
2.1.1 The movement/party members (political workers) 
Several of the intermediaries in Islamabad belong to a left-wing party that 
emerged as a union of smaller left-wing parties and working-class movements. 
One of these movements was an association of slum-dwellers created in the late 
1990s to protect the rights of katchi abadi residents and to campaign against 
forced evictions, which has remained very active in our study locations. Zayan 
joined this slumdwellers association in 2003 when he moved to a katchi abadi in 
Islamabad from his village in Punjab. He had started his political activism back in 
his village in 1982 through the Pakistan Christian Association. He draws his 
legitimacy as an intermediary not only from the party, but also from his status as 
an elder in the community. Both these positions have helped him develop 
personal links with other influential people such as lawyers and local body 
chairmen, as well as a temporary job implementing a water and sanitation 
programme for a national non-governmental organisation (NGO).  
Besides being a party member, Talha is also a teacher in a nearby government 
primary school. Belonging to a poor Shia migrant family, he has faced a lot of 
discrimination and hardship. His migrant religious minority status and firm belief 
in the left-wing party’s ideology is what he says makes him work in katchi abadis 
where Christian migrants form the majority. Since 2015, he has been the party 
member in charge for one of our locations. He uses his party networks and social 
media to solve people’s issues, namely education, health, labour issues, and 
CDA harassment.  
Haseeb uses the same networks and social media platforms as Talha, as well as 
his education and status. He is a graduate of one of Pakistan’s top private 
universities, mainstream Sunni middle class, and does not live in a katchi abadi. 
 
14  While it was constant in the conflict location. 
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Yet, that did not prevent him from being arrested when legally protesting against 
the state for arresting someone else.15 He was a strong advocate of his party 
ideology, even before joining officially in 2017. 
2.1.2 Religious leaders 
In our first phase research – Governance Diaries, several households identified 
religious authorities as important intermediaries, particularly in helping them 
solve issues within the locations. Shamshad is a pastor who leads the oldest of 
the two churches in the conflict location in Islamabad. He came from a village 
near Lahore in 2010, where he was serving under another pastor, and settled as 
the first pastor in this location. He has also created a primary school within the 
church premises. He uses his church and his personal links which he has 
established over time to assist the people of his location mostly with issues 
related to education, health, and domestic disputes.  
In the non-conflict location in Islamabad, Amanat is the eldest serving pastor of 
the two existing churches. In his youth he was a devotee of Islamabad’s patron 
saint’s Sufi shrine. In the initial stages of the non-conflict location (when there 
was active conflict between the residents and the CDA), Amanat decided to get 
his religious education and became the pastor of the location. While formally he 
says he draws his legitimacy from being one of the two pastors, informally it is 
his personal connections with several local government officials that help him 
mediate people’s problems. For instance, in the initial Covid-19-related lockdown 
he joined forces with a police inspector friend to form a youth group to assist with 
relief distribution. Amanat is also often the first person in his locality from whom 
people borrow small amounts of money. 
Baba Gilli has lived in Islamabad for at least 20 years. For most of this time he 
was a political worker for a mainstream party, but his pir16 motivated him to help 
people differently. Since then, he has followed the teachings of his pir, spreading 
his message, and providing people with free traditional medicine as a local 
hakeem (traditional healer). Besides his connections with the pir and the office 
holders of his political party, he also has family links with the leadership of 
another mainstream political party, and he is an elder of his location. All of this 
makes Baba Gilli well known in the Christian community for solving people’s 
issues, particularly related to health, education, housing, and water supply. 
2.1.3 CDA links 
Another set of important intermediaries in Islamabad are those that have strong 
connections with the CDA. One of them is Jon, a retired civil servant who worked 
 
15  Although it did help with getting him released. 
16  Spiritual guide. 
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in the CDA for over 20 years and before that, during Zia’s military regime, in the 
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). He is one of the few residents who built his 
own concrete home and owns a car. Jon is an intermediary on a voluntary basis; 
he is of the view that local residents are helpless and that is unfair, so he wants 
to help them as much as he can. According to him, residents of katchi abadis do 
not have access to basic facilities nor land security: CDA gives them NOCs (no 
objection certificates), but they have no legal value. Besides, the NOCs state that 
the CDA can take the land back from the residents whenever it wants to. 
Although Jon has no formal legitimacy as an intermediary, he is comparatively 
strong financially and his background and networks in government offices are 
key sources of his informal legitimacy.  
Paul is the elected chairman of the CDA’s labour union council. He was a very 
senior political worker in one of the mainstream political parties for most of his 
life, and it is only in the recent labour union elections that he ran independently. 
As such, he enjoys good links inside the CDA, as well as with politicians and 
Members of the National Assembly (MNAs). Despite living in a government-
allotted house, Paul spends most of his time around katchi abadis constantly 
canvassing votes for the union elections and offering his help as this is where 
most of the (unskilled and low skilled) CDA labourers live. A Muslim, he has 
developed over time a reputation in Christian katchi abadis as someone who is 
concerned with poor people and can be trusted. He believes that it is the state’s 
responsibility to provide basic necessities to citizens and that people living in 
katchi abadis are equally entitled. Because of their marginalisation, he feels his 
responsibility increases with respect to the rights of people living in these 
locations. Often, he tries to stop anti-encroachment operations by contacting 
relevant people in the CDA department. 
2.2 Intermediaries in Punjab 
The conflict in Punjab has its roots in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century 
when the British Raj initiated the Punjab irrigation system and established canal 
colonies. The vast expanse of land that these colonies comprised was sparsely 
inhabited by nomad tribes and mostly forested. The farmers from east Punjab 
that now constitute India were encouraged to make this land arable, resulting in 
the internal migration of thousands of farmers, ultimately responsible for huge 
demographic changes in Punjab. This land was used by the British Raj to reward 
the elites who had helped them in the 1857 War of Independence.17 A big swath 
of the land in our research location and some adjoining districts was leased out 
to the British Indian Army to be used for stud farming and horse breeding.  
 
17  The logic of land grant allocation – with the aim of bringing wasteland under cultivation – was 
considerably more diverse, with the creation of Proprietary villages (zamindari, pattidari, and bhaichara) 
and Crown villages (chak) (see Khan Mohmand 2019). 
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The lease agreement in 1913 was signed for 20 years, expiring in 1934, after 
which the tenants were to get ownership rights. The British Raj decided to let the 
arrangement linger and none of their promises were kept: the land continued 
under the ownership of the British Indian Army without any legal lease 
agreement. In 1947, with the country’s independence, the land was given to the 
Pakistan Army along with the sharecropping system (battai). In our location, 
more than 7,000 hectares of this land is governed by the Pakistan military.18 
In 2000, during General Musharraf’s dictatorship, the military suddenly changed 
the nature of the lease so that tenants paid an annual rent instead of in kind, 
thereby turning them to contracted labour with no occupancy rights. According to 
Pakistan’s Tenancy Act of 1887, sharecroppers are either ‘occupancy tenants’ 
who have the statutory rights to occupy the land, or ‘simple tenants’ who occupy 
the land on the basis of a contract with the landlord and no occupancy rights. 
While simple tenants are obliged to leave the land when the landlord so desires, 
occupancy tenants can only be made to vacate the land with court orders. In 
2000, the army turned these farmers into simple contract holders, contracted 
labour with no occupancy rights (HRW 2004). This triggered a strong resistance 
amongst the farmers who organised themselves into a representative body, a 
tenants’ association, to fight their case in a peaceful but assertive way. The 
tenants’ association started a civil disobedience movement and refused to pay 
the 50 per cent share of the harvest whereon the military started using pressure 
tactics. 
2.2.1 The tenants’ association members 
Aapa, the only female intermediary in this study, is a member of the tenants’ 
association and leader of the women’s wing. She is actively involved in solving 
and mediating a vast array of issues related to land, welfare, labour rights, 
education, and family issues. Along with that, she is the first port of call for 
women in this location. Even though panchayat meetings are less common now 
in her village, as an elder and active member19 she plays a key role in these 
meetings bringing in women’s voices.20 She has good contacts with government 
employees, other prominent politicians, and activists in the area, as well as 
activists in cities like Lahore and Islamabad. Aapa is also actively involved in 
politics. Recently, she was in touch with Nawaz and Doctor (intermediaries in the 
Punjab non-conflict location) to use female spaces in her village to strengthen 
support for their political party.  
 
18  There are also tracts of land that have been allotted to retired army officers. 
19  She inherited this role from her schoolteacher father. 
20  Indirectly though. As a woman she is not physically present in these meetings, sending her eldest son to 
represent her or to hold his mobile so she can speak. 
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Amir is a young father of four who, despite having no formal education and being 
a daily wage worker in the nearby city, has very good contacts almost 
everywhere in the area and keeps on building them. When he is in the village, he 
is an active member of the tenants’ association and panchayat member. He has 
been an intermediary for the last 15 years21 dealing with issues related to land, 
labour rights, family, and finances. He is one of the most active people in the 
area, including being at the forefront of the location’s struggle with the state for 
land rights. He says his resistance towards state authority is because we live in a 
system of injustices, where people who do not own anything are discriminated 
against – and if he does not support them today the same can happen to him 
tomorrow.  
On the other side of the spectrum Arshad is a landlord, a well-to-do 
businessman, member of the tenants’ association, and member of the village 
panchayat. Although he has moved to the nearby city for his children’s education 
he is still fully involved in the affairs of his village. In fact, the panchayat usually 
gathers at his village house. Because of his financial background, he is 
considered a very important voice in the panchayat and a source of financial 
assistance even for other intermediaries. He has been an intermediary from 
more than 25 years and got very active after the land dispute between farmers 
and the state. He fought unsuccessfully at the last union council elections as an 
independent candidate but has now joined the ruling party. 
2.2.2 The rival association 
Siraj was originally part of the tenants’ association. Over time, he started 
developing strong connections with different government authorities and joined 
the rival association that claims to represent tenants’ voices. He comes from an 
influential family and inherited his intermediary role from his father 15 years ago. 
He is also a panchayat member and despite some animosity towards members 
of the tenants’ association,22 when an issue concerns the whole community, he 
coordinates with other intermediaries in the area – including rivals. His good 
relations with civil administration and security agencies make him very influential 
as an intermediary, as most important issues in the area tend to involve these 
authorities. So besides helping with family disputes (divorces and marriages) and 
financial issues, people ask him for help when they have issues that involve the 
government authorities. Siraj is also planning to contest the upcoming local 
elections.  
Shafi is a local landlord with a very stable life. He is a member of both the rival 
association and the local panchayat. He inherited his role of intermediary from 
 
21  A role inherited from his father. 
22  For instance, together with Shafi, he is publicly siding with a person trying to take over part of Aapa’s 
land. 
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his father more than 20 years ago. According to him, he tries to help everyone 
and never lets anyone feel indebted to him. He tries to solve people’s issues – 
particularly daily labourers – by lending them money for fodder and other 
immediate needs and accompanying them to the police station whenever there 
is a security issue. Shafi has developed good relations with the police over time 
by visiting them often. He is also part of the local mosque committee, responsible 
for religious affairs as well as social welfare work. Similar to Siraj, although not 
the best of friends with members of the tenants’ association, when there is an 
issue that affects them all he coordinates and cooperates with them. 
2.2.3 In the city 
Rayan has been an intermediary for more than 20 years, after taking over from 
his father. He is an official party officer with the ruling party which takes most of 
his time,23 despite also running his own small business in the city. Both his family 
history and political affiliation make him an effective intermediary. He is on good 
terms with the MNA for this constituency (who is also a member of the ruling 
party) as well as with government officers. As is the case with other 
intermediaries, he deals with all types of issues: from family issues (including 
divorce and dowry), to financial and legal issues – and anything which involves 
police and courts.24 Also very importantly, he is part of a biradari-based 
association that protects the rights of their group. Together with people from 
other political parties and across villages of the district, they use each other’s 
contacts to improve the lives of ‘their’ people (their biradari), which in turn helps 
them gain further influence and power over the area. 
2.2.4 The religious party members 
Nawaz is the district chairperson of a mainstream religious party and president of 
the party’s local youth branch. He works on social causes through a faith-based 
NGO linked to the party and looks after affairs of his nearby village as a 
panchayat member. Although he comes from a wealthy landlord family, he 
believes the class system is a highly unjustifiable social construct that needs to 
be fought. The mixture of family links, his formal position in the party, and his 
social status makes him a very effective intermediary not only in his village but 
throughout the district. He is heavily involved in promoting his party and 
associated NGO for the upcoming local elections through face-to-face 
campaigning and active use of various social media platforms.  
 
23  He is involved (formally and informally) with both the Ehsaas Relief Programme and the Corona Relief 
Tiger Force. 
24  Thana and kacheri. 
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Doctor is a medical doctor by profession. A member of the same mainstream 
religious party as Nawaz, he has contested and lost both provincial and national 
elections recently. He has been an intermediary for more than 30 years. Before 
being an official party member, he was already active through the party’s student 
wing during his university days. According to him, he helps resolve all kinds of 
disputes in the area. His party has a well-coordinated network of volunteers in 
every district and every village of the country, so he uses those contacts to 
resolve people’s issues. Since the beginning of the pandemic, Doctor has 
worked tirelessly to assist the most vulnerable in the city and nearby villages, 
both as a medical expert and as a party leader.25 
 
25  Sadly, Doctor caught Covid-19 in late January 2021 and died a month later due to Covid-19-related 
complications. 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 550 





3. Intermediaries’ strategies and 
practices 
Intermediaries make themselves essential by using a set of strategies to solve 
people’s problems in their locations. The most common strategies involve:  
(1) learning and speaking the language of public authorities and in particular the 
state, (2) networking – by constantly creating and sustaining networks outside 
their communities both physically and online, and (3) collectivising – building 
collectivising power by maintaining reciprocity relations with their communities, a 
sort of give and take26 where poor people give them legitimacy through numbers 
(being present in protests when called on by the intermediary), in return for 
intermediaries’ help solving their problems. 
 
3.1 Speaking the language of public authorities 
Foremost, intermediaries speak the language of public authorities, giving them a 
direct channel to the latter. Their ability to communicate with public authorities, 
whether formal or informal, sets them apart from the people they represent. This 
goes beyond literal communication: not only are intermediaries fluent in Urdu 
and/or Punjabi as well as being able to speak and read some English, but they 
are also well versed in legal or procedural technicalities that bolster their case. 
When a katchi abadi in Islamabad was at risk of being demolished by the 
authorities, residents turned to their left-wing party’s intermediaries; the latter 
filed a petition in the Islamabad High Court, ultimately obtaining a stay order. 
When the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) officials 
refused to issue birth certificates, Pastor Shamshad relied on his network to 
persuade a lawyer to tell the officials that if they did not issue the birth certificate, 
they would be infringing on the family’s rights and would risk a court case.  
Literacy and language facilitate access to public authorities at the highest level. 
One intermediary, who wished to help the residents of an Islamabad katchi abadi 
who were living in tents in far from salubrious conditions, contacted his party 
members and asked for their help. They suggested he write directly to the Prime 
Minister. Although nobody responded to his request, he was ultimately able to 
arrange loans (through another contact) to purchase raw material for the 
households; the community managed to build over 100 houses in his location. 
Through language, intermediaries can bridge the gap between the state and 
citizens, with the former relying on intermediaries to disseminate public service 
messages. In one case, it was the authorities, a police inspector, who asked an 
 
26  Lena dena – in Urdu, taking and giving. 
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intermediary to help convey Covid-19 protocols to the people in his area because 
the authorities had done so less effectively. This is not to suggest that 
intermediaries are always successful, regardless of whether they ‘speak the 
same language’. In a nearby katchi abadi, they were unable to persuade the 
authorities to clear litter in the area and ultimately relied on mobilising the 
community itself to do so after the authorities simply refused. 
The extent to which intermediaries rely on their access to public authorities 
differs considerably and being in direct contact with the latter does not mean that 
intermediaries adopt their approach. Indeed, those associated with the political 
opposition use the language of public authority differently, even oppressively. In 
one case, Nawaz, an intermediary in Punjab, felt that the district administration 
was not doing enough to control the spread of infection during the Covid-19 
crisis, to the extent of favouring the use of force to impose standard operating 
procedures (SOPs). Noor, a village numberdar,27 on the other hand, praised the 
work of the Tiger Force in attempting to redistribute resources, saying they were 
‘trained very well’ and would ‘help reduce the injustices around us’. 
Intermediaries’ access to language also translates into their access to 
information. Amir, an intermediary, explained that he relied on press conferences 
and social media to remain apprised of the government’s Covid-19 SOPs – and 
the associated narrative surrounding the crisis. 
Intermediaries’ use of language to negotiate outcomes may differ depending on 
whether they are operating in a conflict or non-conflict location and, if the former, 
on the nature (and history) of that conflict. Intuitively, non-conflict settings enable 
better relations between intermediaries and public authorities. In Islamabad, for 
example, the Supreme Court’s stay order prohibiting the demolition of katchi 
abadis has diluted the extent to which this might be considered a conflict setting 
and intermediaries have learned over time what course to take if the CDA 
launches an unannounced anti-encroachment operation. As Shamshad, an 
intermediary in a conflict location said, ‘Nowadays, if somebody encroaches on 
the land and the CDA gets involved, [it is possible to] negotiate with the residents 
and resolve the issue’. This contrasts with earlier when, in the absence of the 
stay order, residents had no legal grounds to prevent eviction and would resort to 
bribing the CDA for permission to remain.  
In Punjab, some intermediaries have managed to challenge the authorities 
successfully. In the city, both Doctor and Nawaz became involved in a dispute 
with a local retired army officer allottee who had ill-treated sharecroppers.28 They 
lodged a complaint at the police station, but not before an altercation with the 
army officer and the Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP). It was only after 
 
27  Landowner with hereditary state powers (mostly revenue collection). 
28  See Episode B (Figure A2) in the Annexe. 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 550 





their supporters took to the street in protest that the DSP agreed to negotiate. It 
was, for the intermediaries, ‘a big win for the people as we stood up against the 
powerful!’ In Aapa’s case, she was asked to leave the polling station during the 
local elections because the Station House Officer (SHO) said her presence might 
cause trouble because the opposition claimed voters would vote for her 
candidate out of fear. She did not leave but kept a low profile, saying that voters 
would ‘vote for me if they want and they will not vote for me if they don’t want’. 
Their relationship with public authorities determines how intermediaries choose 
to present themselves in public. Those who have strong, reliable or formal 
relations with public authorities are more likely to be assertive because they are 
perceived as being ‘trustworthy’ by the authorities. Should an intermediary’s 
relationship with public authorities weaken or become unreliable, his or her 
importance also fizzles out. A good example of this is Jon’s episode when he 
attempted to raise a compound wall on an empty lot in Islamabad which he felt 
could be put to good use as a janazgah29 and the CDA objected. Aapa said she 
was not in a position to challenge a corrupt public official in her area because, in 
her words, ‘a fish cannot challenge the crocodiles while living in the same pond’. 
The thickness of a network is a key factor that differentiates conflict locations 
from non-conflict ones. Intermediaries’ significance and functions are directly 
correlated with the network(s) they use to resolve people’s problems. Those with 
a thick networking presence inevitably become more important than others. For 
example, in the conflict location in Islamabad, Jon’s and Baba Gilli’s social and 
political capital – which enabled them to write directly to the Home Minister and 
CDA Chairperson and to solicit material help from friends in the construction 
business – played a central role in the resettlement of a significant population 
displaced from another katchi abadi. In Baba Gilli’s case, his membership of a 
political party meant he became a natural focal point for complainants and 
government officials. Some intermediaries augment this by building alliances 
preferably with the ruling party so that they become part of the government 
system and can maximise benefits for their settlement. In Punjab, both Nawaz 
and Amir relied on their contacts in the district administration to access and 
distribute food rations during the Covid-19 emergency. 
 
3.2 Networking 
Intermediaries make themselves important by constantly creating and sustaining 
physical and online networks outside their communities. In Islamabad, the left-
wing party’s intermediaries are connected to katchi abadi residents 
predominantly through social media; they will often film the site or circumstances 
of a problem – the threat of eviction, for example – and share it across different 
 
29  A place to perform funeral rites. See Episode C (Figure A3) in Annexe. 
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social media platforms as a way of mobilising public awareness and opinion or 
material help, based on video evidence and survivors’ testimonies. This strategy 
was successful enough to elicit a response from higher government officials, 
including material support from the Human Rights Ministry. It also generated 
additional networks linked to the state and to non-government organisations that 
became involved in relief efforts, thereby creating a thicker and more effective 
network. 
In the case of intermediaries in Punjab, Aapa has cultivated contacts within and 
outside her community while conveying to her community that she has made a 
concerted effort to do so, whether to obtain funds for food and clothing or to help 
lodge a police report against a rights violation; this has bolstered and legitimised 
her own relationship with the community. 
In conflict locations, such networks are less stable and are rooted in short-term 
results, whereas non-conflict locations enable relatively stable networks that last 
longer. Moreover, the nature and history of the conflict are important when it 
comes to sustaining and creating new networks. For example, when the left-wing 
party workers (including the study’s intermediaries) were arrested at a protest in 
support of a civil rights movement, this created enough of a sense of fear that, 
even after they were released, a subsequent movement protest did not attract 
party workers in the numbers it was expected to. It is not uncommon for the state 
to use such tactics to intimidate citizens, thereby damaging intermediaries’ 
networks. 
The thickness of an existing network can also give people access to alternative 
intermediaries. In Punjab, for example, one intermediary pointed out that 
‘Everyone knows everyone else here. We all are interconnected. We know 
what’s happening in each other’s lives’. Not only do intermediaries tend to 
connect with their own networks, but they also attempt to create new networks to 
sustain their existing role. One intermediary in Punjab explained that she had 
approached a doctor at a government hospital through her sister (a nurse), and 
on the doctor’s advice, was motivating pregnant women to have regular check-
ups to avoid having to pay hefty fees closer to delivery. 
 
3.3 Collectivising 
As a rule of thumb, intermediaries solve small issues and collectivise (aggregate 
voices and numbers) when dealing with bigger issues. Intermediaries largely 
deal with small issues themselves or with the help of other intermediaries within 
their locations, for instance, for domestic problems, accessing health facilities, 
schools, getting financial loans, etc. For bigger issues though, such as land 
disputes and conflict, or recently to deal with the lockdown and people’s loss of 
livelihoods as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, intermediaries collectivise not 
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only the people they claim to represent, but also other intermediaries including 
intermediaries from different political parties. We also notice this mobilisation 
happening when they have to deal with local authorities, particularly security 
agencies. Intermediaries build collectivising power in two ways: (1) by 
maintaining reciprocity relations with the community (‘I help you, you vouch for 
me’), and (2) by maintaining accountability relations that inform and justify their 
actions to both above and below them. 
In the first instance, their collectivising power is a function of the community they 
claim to represent. Thus, the moment an intermediary loses this connection by 
failing to engage in the community’s cause, he or she becomes more 
dispensable. In the case of one intermediary, this occurred over time: so long as 
he served as a bridge between the community and the state in helping people 
shift from one katchi abadi to another, he was ‘essential’. Once the community 
settled down, it had less need of him, and Jon found his role diminishing. 
Reciprocity relations also give intermediaries the legitimacy they need to hold 
onto power, to the extent that intermediaries such as Aapa and Amir say, ‘If not 
us, then who?’, effectively indicating to their communities a quid pro quo, a lena 
dena – if you do not support us today, then we may not be able to support you 
when the time comes. Aapa has collectivised action in this way by speaking up 
against arrests and evictions and urging the community to stand together. In 
turn, when she felt she was being harassed by security agencies, she could rely 
on the community to help keep her safe by lodging with different households 
every night.  
In conflict settings, intermediaries’ collectivising power becomes even more 
important because they are better positioned to tackle frequent encounters with 
the state, as is the case in Islamabad, where intermediaries can take on the CDA 
where the community, on its own, cannot. Intermediaries who have better 
relations with influential public authorities are also better able to gain 
communities’ trust, making their collectivising power more effective. The 
thickness of existing networks is also a factor: intermediaries with thicker 
networks tend to command higher expectations from their communities. For 
example, those who were involved in relief efforts during the Covid-19 crisis 
found that, if they skipped a household during distribution because it was already 
on a social security programme relief list, the household would tell the 
intermediary directly that any relief it had received had nothing to do with the 
latter, thereby diminishing the intermediary’s role. 
In the second instance, accountability relations stem from a tacit understanding 
between intermediary and community. In Jon’s case in Islamabad, when the 
community did not support his attempt to claim vacant land as an area to create 
a janazgah, he was ultimately compelled to stop his efforts despite his 
justification that it was for the good of the community. Amir explained that he 
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relied on a system that helped him identify people who needed access to food 
and other supplies, based on the interconnectedness of the community. Nawaz 
noted that, when it came to distributing food rations, he would give donors the 
option of either donating to them directly or using their list of households. 
Volunteers are held accountable too, with Nawaz keeping a check on the teams 
that collected and distributed food rations through Al Khidmat Foundation 
officials. 
In conflict settings, however, accountability relations may be affected adversely: 
public authorities may be less likely to trust intermediaries, while intermediaries 
may be less ready to represent the community’s problems. Additionally, people 
may be motivated by self-interest. For example, when Baba Gilli sought his 
bishop’s help to install two water pumps in the area, he discovered that the 
people installing one pump were charging more than the anticipated cost. When 
this practice was halted, they began ‘selling’ the water from the pump instead. 
‘Imagine how shameless they are’, exclaimed Baba Gilli, ‘people are fraudsters, 
they do not need an honest person at all’. 
Intermediaries’ relationships with public authorities shape the accountability 
pattern they adopt with the community. Intermediaries are accountable to the 
public authorities with whom they are involved; if this relationship is informal, 
then their collectivising power may be more arbitrary, while relatively formal 
relations are associated with a more defined process of accountability. In Jon’s 
case,30 the community was unwilling to support his attempt to claim vacant land 
for use as a janazgah because they felt that, if anything were to go wrong, they 
risked being arrested for illegal land grabbing. 
Collectivisation can mean: (1) creating a collective, (2) being part of a collective, 
or (3) satisfying a collective. An implicit function of intermediaries is to encourage 
collective action, which may be born out of a personal initiative driven by 
adversity or with the intention of social service. One intermediary, Gufran, said 
that he had been involved in community work, which included helping flood 
victims, even before he launched his NGO. Intermediaries also encourage 
collective action outside their community where possible. As Pastor Amanat 
explained, the community had a number of members employed at government 
hospitals who helped others outside their community access health care based 
on the information they were in a position to provide. Other instances of creating 
collective action include intermediaries’ efforts to: (1) document katchi abadi 
evictions in Islamabad and mobilise public opinion until the state was compelled 
to take action; (2) organise contested agricultural land in the conflict location in 
Punjab to be sown such that the allottee could not legally reclaim it; and,  
(3) mobilise large crowds in the non-conflict location in Punjab against rights 
 
30  See Episode C (Figure A3) in the Annexe. 
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violations perpetrated by an army officer and to successfully get a police report 
registered against him, despite his influence. 
Being part of a collective can also translate into mobilising and enhancing 
collective action. This is clear in the case of Baba Gilli, when he initiated 
community-led construction work in his location; many of the area’s 
intermediaries are from outside the location and often organise protests to 
protect the rights of people living in precarious conditions in other contexts. In 
Punjab, Rayan and Amir were both able to mobilise action as part of a collective 
by raising funds for households that needed food rations and other supplies 
during lockdown because they were part of the collective. Finally, intermediaries 
may have to satisfy the collective because they are ‘stuck’ with them. Similar to 
the politics of majboori31 which Khan Mohmand and Javid (2014) and Malik and 
Malik (2017) discuss in their analysis of voting behaviour and clientelistic political 
exchange in rural Punjab, ‘clientelism is not simply a negotiated relationship 
between two groups of unequal power, but one that is based on obligations and 
embedded exchanges’ that residents and intermediaries ‘have come to interpret 
as helplessness’ (Malik and Malik 2017: 1822). In rural Punjab, dynastic 
intermediation is more than just a tradition; it is a majboori (of the obligation kind) 
that follows every intermediary family. In Jon’s case in Islamabad, his efforts 
were unsuccessful: once certain community members began to sell the land they 
had been allotted in the location, resulting in disputes, the entire community was 
affected adversely and Jon lost his capacity to intervene, ultimately retiring from 
his position as chairman. ‘We tried to distance ourselves from the affairs of the 
abadi because I think that violence is not a good thing to deal with’ he explained. 
Yet, despite all that, he remains an intermediary; he is ‘stuck’ with them. 
 
3.4 Solving peoples’ problems 
What do poor households get in exchange for giving intermediaries legitimacy 
through numbers? In return, intermediaries play a key role in poor households’ 
lives by solving internal disputes within their localities, they try to deal with 
external threats (to a certain extent) and help households access public goods. 
There is some variation across our four locations, which we will unpack in the 
following section, but first we quickly describe here how this variation plays out. 
In Islamabad, in both conflict and non-conflict locations, pastors of all churches 
play an essential role in solving disputes internal to the location. Whenever some 
issue arises, people go to them for guidance before going to the police or other 
state institutions. Because of their religious office, pastors have a respectable 
status and people listen and follow their instructions. In addition to the pastors, 
intermediaries who have connections with the various political parties and 
 
31  Best translated as helplessness and obligation. 
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movements also use their networks to resolve the issues of inhabitants of katchi 
abadis. In both conflict and non-conflict settings in Punjab we also see 
intermediaries playing an important role in resolving internal issues peacefully. 
Often the first point of reference are the elders: Arshad mentioned that any 
internal issue that arises in the village is referred to the panchayat, who then 
meet either at his father’s house (dera) or at the bethak,32 rather than going to 
the police or courts. ‘We, as mediators prefer resolving issues internally first’. As 
every intermediary is well-connected and respected, they often come forward 
themselves to offer help in internal dispute negotiations, particularly to poorer 
households who lack contacts and status. For instance, Aapa and Amir use their 
strong networks and links with intermediaries outside their village to try to solve 
peacefully people’s issues, as these outside intermediaries – if trusted by all 
parties – bring a neutral voice to the negotiations. Nawaz and Doctor are also 
called to help solve internal issues in the city without going to the police, since 
they belong to wealthy families and have a trusted political background due to 
their affiliation with a mainstream religious political party. 
Many issues are typically resolved at the local level,33 often involving 
intermediaries acting in lieu of, or as public authorities either individually or as 
part of a collective such as a group of elders and panchayats. Preference for 
solving issues locally, particularly dispute resolution, is the trend across South 
Asia. Khan Mohmand et al. (2010) observe across rural Pakistan and India that 
citizens are more likely to go to the state when they are wealthier, from higher-
ranked biradaris, and with less faith in what they call informal local governance 
institutions or ILGIs.34 They posit that ILGIs remain relevant and popular with the 
poor as a substitute for the state, because it gives them an opportunity to access 
quick, easy, and cheap justice (even if unjust). This is because for most poor 
households and women in particular it is hard to access formal justice 
institutions, partly because the process is time consuming, lawyer fees are high, 
and courts are far away (Acemoglu et al. 2020), and partly because in FCVAS 
state justice is equated with oppression and punishment.35 The same applies to 
urban settings: intermediaries in the capital, such as Shamshad, claim that most 
people prefer to solve their disputes locally rather than going to the police. Once 
there a was domestic abuse case in his street. While the husband was beating 
his wife one of the neighbours came to the house and tried to stop the husband. 
That quickly escalated into a fight between the men. In that fight, the husband 
was seriously injured and had to be admitted to the hospital. Rather than going 
to the police station and registering a police case, family members of both parties 
went to the pastor to ask him to resolve the issue. Shamshad struck a deal in 
 
32  Collective male sitting space in the village. 
33  By local we mean at the neighbourhood (mohallah) in urban settings and within the village (gaon) in 
rural settings. 
34  See Ananth Pur (2007). 
35  Panchayat decisions tend to be restorative rather than punitive (Acemoglu et al. 2020). 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 550 





which the neighbour had to pay the expenditures of the injured person’s 
household for three months. He stated that it was a voluntary process, and 
nobody was forced during the process. ‘Most people avoid going to the police 
because they do not trust the police’, he added. 
Acemoglu et al. (2020) show that part of that avoidance is directly linked to state 
institutions’ effectiveness and that, despite the deep-rooted mistrust of the 
Pakistani state, credible information can change people’s beliefs and behaviour. 
They find that improving the quality of state dispute resolution improves people’s 
beliefs about state courts while simultaneously making them more pessimistic 
about the effectiveness of ILGIs and therefore reducing people’s trust in these. 
Yet, there is a pull and push dynamic in the power relations between formal and 
informal actors that we cannot ignore: informal institutions at times also make 
sure the state does not get involved. According to Rayan, people and 
intermediaries try their best to solve issues by themselves or with the panchayat, 
as:  
Parties will have to visit police, local courts, spend time and money 
on legal fees etc., so the panchayat prefers that issues should be 
resolved within the elders of the village. People understand that and 
panchayats put on the penalty fee on parties to resolve their issue. 
The fees are set according to the intensity of the issue. 
Even with police reported cases, panchayats call the police and ask them to step 
aside, so that they can resolve the issue within the community. If need be, then 
they themselves inform the police to take action. 
Cooperation between intermediaries largely occurs when dealing with external 
threats. In fact, although these events are less common as compared to 
everyday internal disputes, these are the moments where we witness 
households and intermediaries coming together to defend their ground. For 
instance, in the Punjab conflict location, intermediaries from different political 
backgrounds and associations came forward to protect the people from the 
allottees who they believe will take over their lands one day.36 We also see 
households and intermediaries coming together to defend each other, such as 
the case when Doctor and Nawaz fought with the DSP on behalf of 
sharecroppers, got arrested, and then the sharecroppers barged into the police 
station to protect Doctor and Nawaz.37 While quite often intermediaries in Punjab 
referred to ‘all of us’ when discussing mobilisation against external threats, in 
Islamabad there were particular names brought forward. In the non-conflict 
location, many households and even other intermediaries mention Zayan as the 
person who they approach in matters related to external threats to the location. 
 
36  See Episode A (Figure A1) in the Annexe. 
37  See Episode B (Figure A2) in the Annexe. 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 550 





Not only because he is one of the first settlers, but also because his name is 
always associated with the left-wing party who helped them petition the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan for the stay order. Whenever there are external threats in the 
conflict location, most often CDA’s anti-encroachment drives or individual CDA 
officials coming to harass residents, Baba Gilli and Shamshad are the ones 
playing a more active role in defusing the situation. Baba Gilli through his political 
connections, and Shamshad through his religious networks that spread way 
beyond Islamabad. 
Accessing public goods and services is not easy for poor households, 
particularly in conflict settings. As Aapa said referring to receiving government 
supplies during the Covid-19 lockdown, ‘the only thing that is free here is a baton 
charge’. Thus, the common route to access public goods and services is through 
intermediaries who have good connections with public officials. Yet, this access 
is not free; according to Amir even intermediaries with good connections with 
officials must pay them for any task they want them to perform. In the katchi 
abadis of Islamabad, the situation is not better: many intermediaries highlight 
that whenever they have contacted public officials for the provision of collective 
goods and services, public officials have always refused them stating that ‘it is an 
illegal settlement in Islamabad, and we cannot provide basic services in the 
area’. To fill the gaps, intermediaries such as the pastors in both locations and 
political workers such as Baba Gilli and Talha engage with NGOs, charity 
organisations, and rich people to assist marginalised people. As far as health 
care is concerned, intermediaries in Islamabad have a contact list of the people 
living in the katchi abadis who work as cleaners or nurses in different hospitals of 
the city and ask them to facilitate the process. In rural Punjab rarely do 
intermediaries take people to urban hospitals, instead relying on local healers, 
local dispensers and untrained staff. Accessing official documentation is a big 
problem for katchi abadis residents in Islamabad, as officials they do not have a 
valid physical address. Whenever NADRA’s officers refuse to issue identity cards 
or birth certificates to residents, Baba Gilli and Shamshad play an active role: the 
former using his political contacts, the latter his religious network. 
The biggest headache for intermediaries is how to provide clean water and 
adequate sanitation. For instance, Zayan and others have tried for years to get a 
water connection for their location using personal links inside the CDA but have 
failed. In urban Punjab, even Rayan, a local influential and ruling party worker, 
has been requesting the government to develop a new sanitation system and not 
got very far. Quite often connections are not enough: Nawaz activated all his 
political and personal channels to deal with unsafe drinking water in the village 
but ended up co-funding and installing various filter plants himself. Amir 
mentioned that every time he has to raise a request related to public services 
and utilities, he has to use his connections. But while in hospitals a good 
relationship with the concerned person might be sufficient, in other public offices 
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he has to grease officials’ palms. That leaves the job of intermediary limited to 
people who can afford it, which explains why overwhelmingly our intermediaries 
are relatively well-off compared to the people they work with.38 
 
38  Or, at least, less badly off. 
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4. Contextualising local governance 
systems: explaining variation 
As we start seeing from the previous section, the thickness of connections not 
only plays a role on the diversity across locations, but also on the nature of 
accountability relations. This thickness is related to each location’s historical 
structures – including the strength of parallel governance systems to that of the 
state, the history of the conflict, and level of political competition amongst 
intermediaries. For instance, the Islamabad locations are mostly occupied by 
religious minorities who found safe exit from persecution. While in the non-
conflict location residents carried along some of their old networks and 
connections as they often moved within the city; residents in the conflict location 
overwhelmingly came directly from rural Punjab so their connections and 
networks are less useful in a new context. A large population of Islamabad still 
comes from the rural areas of Punjab bringing along their social structures and 
hierarchies (Khan Mohmand and Gazdar 2007). Most intermediaries and 
households mentioned that they came to know about the location where they live 
today from someone either in their extended family or biradari. 
In Pakistan, the extended family and biradari are the main social protection 
mechanisms particularly for poorer and marginalised households, as state-
mediated social protection was until recently largely confined to the formal 
economy and a small percentage of the urban working class (Sayeed 2004; 
Kabeer, Mumtaz and Sayeed 2010; Loureiro 2013). As households move from 
rural to urban settings though, the usefulness of these connections loses 
strength. Residents and intermediaries in the Punjab locations, however, have 
been there for several generations predating the country’s independence. If, on 
the one hand, they have inherited land and tenancy problems with the state, they 
have on the other, access to more stable and stronger biradari connections. 
Traditionally, biradari leaders use their power to make decisions on marriage, 
exclusion, and mediate access to services (Khan Mohmand and Gazdar 2007). 
While the key mechanism that holds a biradari together is endogamy (marriage 
within the biradari), this is not enough on its own: active membership needs to be 
maintained, often through gift exchange rituals during ceremonial occasions, 
where the aim is not the gift itself, but the obligation to reciprocate on the next 
occasion therefore creating a continuous give-and-take bond: lena dena.39 Still, 
biradaris are highly hierarchical and discriminatory (Martin 2014; Javid and 
Martin 2020), blending intra-biradari competition – where the focus is to ‘keep the 
 
39  Next time though, the receiver has to give an amount slightly higher than received, so the debtor 
becomes a creditor keeping the link alive. See Loureiro (2015) for a review of the literature on biradari 
and reciprocity in Pakistani Punjab. 
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Jones down’ (Wakil 1970: 703) – and inter-biradari cooperation, where the focus 
is on protecting ‘our’ people (apna) versus the ‘others’ (paraya). It is no surprise 
then that all our intermediaries in Punjab belong to mid- and higher-ranked 
biradaris, with some helping lower-ranked biradaris and others only helping their 
biradaris to the detriment of lower-ranked ones. 
Being physically close to the state does have its benefits. In Islamabad, the 
katchi abadis are just a few kilometres away from the central government and all 
the concerned ministries, the prime minister, and main courts. Thus, in theory, 
whenever they need something, they can approach the concerned authorities. 
Intermediaries from both locations in Islamabad mention several examples of 
local representatives (including some of them) meeting ministers and other state 
officials with, for instance, lists of people eligible for minority quota schemes in 
state employment or welfare programmes. We also witness geographical 
advantage within Islamabad: while networks and connections play a big role in 
accessing government menial jobs, the location closer to government institutions 
(including CDA) has a higher proportion of residents working as cleaners, peons, 
and at times even clerks within these government departments, in contrast to 
residents in the other location, on the outskirts of the capital. Still, physically 
close does not necessarily mean automatic access. Intermediaries and 
households in both locations kept reminding us the irony of the state being 
simultaneously close and far: they can see public services, but not access them 
because of where they live40 – and the frustration and feelings of 
disempowerment this creates.  
In Punjab, distance from state authorities is even more problematic, both in 
terms of intensity and breadth. Not only connections with state actors are fewer, 
but also these tend to be largely through a smaller district administration and 
security forces. As we mentioned previously, in Islamabad if people disobey the 
informal rules and decisions taken by elders, the social ostracism and boycott 
they suffer is not as significant as in the case of Punjab. Here, being considered 
a pariah has a direct impact on accessing the state, as this is always mediated 
by those that set and implement the rules of the game. 
Finally, the level of political competition amongst intermediaries also plays a role 
on the thickness of connections. Similar to Auerbach and Thachil’s (2021) 
findings in urban slums in India, we also witness that affiliation with mainstream 
party networks gives intermediaries access to influential elites, helping them fulfil 
residents’ requests ‘from a dismissive and discretionary state’ (ibid.: 3). This 
political competition gives opportunity for party workers to prove their role as an 
effective intermediary, which gives poor people the chance of choosing 
 
40  Two good examples are energy and water supply: residents in katchi abadis point out that they see the 
electricity wires passing above their houses and water mains on the side of their locations but cannot 
access them legally. 
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intermediaries they want to be associated with. Political competition acts as a 
variable more clearly at specific moments. For instance, for mainstream political 
parties it is only around election times that intermediaries in the different katchi 
abadis are identified as important party workers to be paid attention to, and it is 
during this time that intermediaries also get a chance to present themselves to a 
wider audience. Both residents and party workers focus their use of 
accountability practices around political representation in these pre-election 
times, as these locations are seen as vote banks. Even amongst party workers 
of the same party there can be competition. One such case emerged in the 
Islamabad non-conflict location, where Zayan and his neighbour got into a fight 
to prove who deserved to be the left-wing party representative for their location. 
While both in Islamabad and Punjab, we see people trying to align themselves 
with the intermediaries working for the ruling party, this becomes more obvious in 
Punjab with fewer parties contesting,41 and where vote blocs (dharas)42 are more 
stable. 
 
4.1 Governance system as networks 
If we go deeper, we notice that local governance systems are not populated by 
networks, but in fact the networks are the system. It is pertinent to notice that life 
in Pakistani society is strongly built on personal linkages from the private spaces 
of the family to the public spaces of the state and the market. In fact, Pakistan is 
a country of networks based on personalistic linkages: in politics (Khan 
Mohmand 2014); in business (Nadeem and Kayani 2019); and even within the 
bureaucracy (Islam 2004). Everybody networks, and informal networking is 
always the first step to access any good or service, even when people know the 
formal actors involved in the process. And a big informal institution permeating 
society (particularly Punjabi society) is biradari – the largest elephant in the 
room. Javid and Martin (2020) highlight both its pervasiveness and visible 
invisibility when comparing Indian and Pakistani Punjabs, noting that despite 
marriages, vote blocs, panchayats, employment, and nepotism in the 
bureaucracy being often based upon biradari relationships,  
There is barely any official recognition of the existence of [biradari] 
amongst the population, in Pakistan’s political discourse, in the 
pronouncements of its governments and political parties, the protests 
of its social movements and activists, and the analyses of its experts 
and commentators.  
(Javid and Martin 2020: 143) 
 
41  In the Islamabad locations on average 15 parties and 15 independents contested the 2018 elections, 
while in the Punjab locations the average was six parties and seven independents. 
42  For more on vote blocs and dhara politics see Khan Mohmand (2019). 
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Equally, Khan Mohmand et al. (2010) note that while biradari (caste) and land 
are no longer relevant predictors of behaviour in rural India, both continue to 
impact how rural citizens behave and interact with one another in Pakistan, 
particularly in how they resolve their disputes, because of the state’s continuing 
disregard for both land and caste inequality as an issue. 
It is not surprising then that there is a blurriness of formal and informal networks: 
public authority is built and exercised through networks that bring together official 
and unofficial actors and institutions, in which intermediaries are embedded and 
which intermediaries to varying degrees build and sustain. Pastor Shamshad’s 
engagement with NADRA officials is a prime example. Often children living in 
katchi abadis do not have birth certificates which makes it harder for them to 
access limited state services, such as public education. Shamshad helps 
children and their parents to get birth certificates and provides support with 
school admissions. It started when he once went to the NADRA office for the 
birth certificate of a child, but the NADRA officer refused to issue one, as the 
child and parents did not have a legal address. He then contacted a Christian 
friend who is a lawyer and member of the Islamabad Bar Council and asked for 
help. His lawyer friend went with him to the NADRA office and told the officers 
that a birth certificate is the fundamental right of a child and if they did not issue 
the birth certificate then he would have to file a case in court against the NADRA 
officials. After hearing this, NADRA officials issued the birth certificate and since 
then do so whenever Shamshad goes to their office. As we can see in this 
example, quite often the difference between being excluded or included is 
connected to the strength of a person’s network – or their intermediary’s network. 
Whilst there are formal institutions that are recognised as holding some public 
authority in each location, it is better to think of public authority as residing in 
networks between these and other informal or unofficial powerholders, built and 
activated by individuals, including intermediaries. As we mentioned previously, 
these networks look different in different locations, more or less dense at 
village/neighbourhood level, and extending outside of the immediate location to 
different degrees. For example, pastors in both conflict and non-conflict locations 
have established their networks within their locations and beyond: Pastor 
Amanat works with people in his neighbourhood as well as with other pastors 
(including Shamshad), charities, NGOs, political party workers, and government 
officials – including police officers. In fact, it was precisely with a young police 
officer that Amanat created the youth group we mentioned in the previous 
section to assist with the distribution of rations during the initial Covid-19-related 
lockdown. The assistance households received during this period gives us a 
good example of public authority residing in these blurred networks: being in 
beneficiary lists, getting relief packages from either state or non-state sources all 
depended on a mixture of state authorities and intermediaries working together, 
where it is not always easy to see where one’s authority ended and the other 
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started. In one case, government officials came to intermediaries and asked 
them to spread the Covid-19-related awareness messages in the katchi abadis 
acknowledging the state’s limited reach.43 In another case, even CDA officers 
and police asked the left-wing party’s intermediaries, more often foes than 
friends, to help them identify struggling households in need of relief packages.44 
 
4.2 Dynastic mediation 
Networks and the distribution of public authority appear to be quite durable or 
‘sticky’, often with deep historical roots. Some people might think that contexts 
labelled as fragile, conflict, and violence-affected would have high levels of 
fluctuation and unpredictability in terms of who holds power. Our data suggests 
this is not typically the case in our locations. There are long-standing and 
embedded power structures and structures of authority that pre-date recent or 
current conflict. None is more significant nor resistant than biradari and biradari-
ism.45 According to Gilmartin (1994) whilst powerful biradari identities in Punjab 
predate the colonial era, they obtained political importance as a counterpoint to 
the politics of bureaucratic centralisation under British colonial rule, to the extent 
that the unique political roles biradaris play in contemporary politics reflect the 
legacies and contradictions established between the colonial state and Punjabi 
society.46 Part and parcel of biradari-ism is the position some biradaris continue 
to have, particularly in rural Punjab, sustained through dynastic politics.47 
Dynastic politicians have extensive family networks, using them to dispense 
patronage and mobilise voters and supporters (Malik and Malik 2017). Yet, 
because dynastic politicians care about and work to promote the success of their 
entire families and not just the individual, they create very different relationships 
with their voters, supporters, and their party (Yadav 2020). Interestingly, studies 
(Ali 2016; Cheema, Javid and Naseer 2013; Yadav 2020) show that dynastic 
politicians are not necessarily better for their constituencies. Ali (2016), studying 
the impact of dynasties on public spending in flood-affected districts of Pakistan 
finds that dynastic politicians spent less on development than non-dynastic 
politicians, and dynastic politicians belonging to biradari spent even less when 
compared to other dynastic politicians. Yadav (2020), using survey data with 150 
Pakistani politicians finds that dynastic politicians are significantly more 
 
43  Ironically, the same intermediaries have been approaching the same government officials to help clean 
the katchi abadis. Possibly those initial complaints made the officials select these intermediaries to help 
with the campaign. 
44  See Episode D (Figure A4) in the Annexe. 
45  Caste and kinship politics. 
46  Javid (2011) notes that the administrative set up of colonial Punjab was similar to that of pre-colonial 
regimes, needing local groups to support it, which explains the cooperation between local elites and the 
colonial state. Gilmartin (1994) does not deny this, he simply highlights that the colonial state increased 
the level of power and patronage local elites have had since then. 
47  See Cheema, Javid and Naseer (2013). 
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supportive of institutions and practices that mediate political competition and 
access to political and policy power such as free and fair elections, an 
independent judiciary, and a free media when compared to non-dynastic 
politicians. Yet, she finds no differences when it comes to support for human 
rights (which is low across all politicians). 
Every intermediary in Punjab has inherited his or her role from their forefathers, a 
sort of dynastic intermediation. As some of our intermediaries said, it is 
something that runs in the family. Some, like Shafi, Doctor, and Nawaz, 
mentioned that if God has blessed them with adequate resources and 
connections then why should they not help poor and marginalised people. We 
can see a good example of this passing of the baton in Aapa’s relationship with 
her eldest son. Although she is the member of the panchayat (inherited from her 
father) and a very active member of the tenants’ association, as a woman she 
does not physically attend panchayat meetings. Instead, she sends her son to 
represent her. While doing so, she is also training him to become the next in line 
within her family. 
There is an expression we heard several of our intermediaries say in our 
interviews when discussing their role as intermediaries for the poor and 
marginalised: ‘If not us, then who?’ The extended version of this expression is 
actually ‘if not us, then who would help them?’ After several rounds of analysis,48 
we notice that this expression has three meanings: one, that because there is 
little or no state presence in these locations – a lack of direct state–citizen 
engagement – if it was not for the presence of intermediaries poor and 
marginalised households would have no access to services and goods; two, the 
importance of the role of intermediaries on its own as compared to non-
intermediaries (for solving people’s problems, for linking them with the state, for 
challenging the state on their behalf…); and three, it reasserts their claim for 
dynastic mediation. We are the sons and daughters of intermediaries, we have 
generations of intermediaries behind us, we are entitled to be the real 
intermediaries: ‘If not us, then who?’ 
Yet, dynastic mediation is also challenged and contested, including by other 
intermediaries. At times we see challengers to long-standing power structures, 
such as political activists and new intermediaries or intermediary organisations 
that try to work within these systems. While the emergence of new leaders to 
challenge traditional leaders – or new public authority – appears limited in 
Pakistan, there is some evidence that public authority networks at times struggle 
to respond to shocks and threats, creating opportunities for change.49 During the 
first Covid-19 lockdown we saw how public officials across all locations 
 
48  For thick description, see Geertz (1973). 
49  See Khan Mohmand (2019) for the impact of decentralisation on Punjabi rural politics and redistribution 
policies. 
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depended on intermediaries to provide them with lists of households to be 
enrolled in the different state-funded social protection mechanisms. This created 
an opportunity for both cooperation and competition amongst intermediaries, as 
well as for newer intermediaries to challenge old ones. In Islamabad, one of the 
main intermediaries became ill, lost his livelihood, and his party position (he had 
managed to get his son appointed as the party contact person for the location, 
although he did not live there). When he tried to continue his dual role of 
intermediary and public authority, guiding and dictating people in his location, 
one of his neighbours immediately contested his role: ‘This is not the way of 
doing Chaudrahaht!’50 he said. The neighbour stated publicly that the 
intermediary’s position as a chaudhry did not give him automatic leadership and 
just because he was an elder, he was not necessarily a ruler. His economic 
condition needed to be better, so he could help residents of the location. In other 
words, they should not accept chaudhrys just because they are (hereditarily) a 
chaudhry – they need to give patronage as well. 
 
50  From chaudhry (traditional head of the community), meaning the way of being a chaudhry. 
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In this paper, we argue that in Pakistan intermediaries make themselves 
essential by: (1) speaking the language of public authorities; (2) constantly 
creating and sustaining networks outside their communities; and (3) building 
collectivising power by maintaining reciprocity relations with their communities. In 
doing so, they engage in accountability bargains. Joshi and Fox (2017), while 
characterising accountability bargains, posit that if bargains hold, they can lead 
to virtuous cycles of improved levels of trust and accountability. Yet, they are 
fragile (evolving in contexts of uncertainty and tenuousness) and as such require 
constant engagement to keep them alive. We posit that because of the 
individualistic nature of these bargains in FCVAS they do not lead to virtuous 
cycles of improved levels of trust and accountability – at least not of the system. 
By accepting and navigating the existing system, nurturing personalistic 
accountability relations instead of developing systematic ones, intermediaries 
and households make households’ lives less difficult in the short term, while 
reinforcing a system of oppression.51 
We can draw out three observations from our work for future discussions on 
accountability relations.52 
Intermediaries being accountable to the residents of the locations does not mean 
the system is accountable. One of our initial Governance at the Margins research 
questions asked what forms of accountability surround the practices of 
intermediaries. Our data shows that intermediaries report various practices of 
accountability that they follow. If we unpack it further (Schedler 1999), there is a 
lot of answerability in particular – intermediaries informing, explaining, and 
justifying what they have done (or not done) to try to resolve a problem. 
However, accountability practices of intermediaries do not mean an accountable 
system overall. Where decisions are taken above the heads of intermediaries 
then they are more likely to say that matters are out of their hands. As we 
previously stated, networks are personality-based (personalistic). To make a 
claim, people always think first of who they know within the state, even if they are 
entitled to it without knowing anyone. Even the state works through personalistic 
networks. As such what we often witness are ‘fleeting’ moments of 
accountability, which exist in the absence of a generally accountable system of 
governance. 
Intermediaries play a part in shaping expectations of citizens and of authorities of 
who should be accountable to whom. Because intermediaries are channels for 
 
51  Just like women do when engaging in patriarchal bargains (Kandiyoti 1988). 
52  Thanks are due to Colin Anderson and the Governance at the Margins team for helping to synthesise 
them. 
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access to wider authorities, they play a role in shaping and reinforcing norms and 
expectations of them. This can be by actively communicating about other 
authorities: for example, intermediaries talking to people about how bad the 
state is, and how unresponsive. In several cases we see how intermediaries play 
a role in re-interpreting guidance from above to fit their locations: for instance, 
Amir’s agreements with widows in rural Punjab about how zakat53 will be 
distributed locally. Intermediaries also affect expectations in more subtle ways. 
One puzzle we have not solved yet, relates to the origin of state–intermediary–
citizen relations in our locations: do intermediaries exist because state authorities 
are historically distant, or are state authorities distant because historically there 
have been intermediaries between them and citizens? It looks like in urban 
settings it is the former, and in rural settings the latter. At least it appears that 
local governance networks and the distribution of public authority are more 
durable in rural settings, largely due to their deep historical roots that can be 
traced back to the colonial era (Gilmartin 1994), with state authorities wilfully 
outsourcing governance functions to intermediaries as a way of social and 
political control. Yet, we also see instances of dynastic mediation being 
contested and challenged by newer intermediaries. At the end of the day though, 
at least in FCVAS, accountability bargains are as entrenched in local governance 
systems as the historical mistrust of the state. 
Accountability needs to be understood in relation to the expectations and 
experiences of citizens vis-à-vis authorities, and norms around these. If 
accountability relationships are rooted in expectations that people have of 
authorities (at whatever level) and the ways they see authorities’ obligations to 
them, then these become central. If there is little sight or relevance of higher-
level authorities, then accountability relationships may not extend to them in the 
first place. If the prevailing norm is not to see provision of services or protection 
as rights but as gifts, then accountability relationships are weaker. If experiences 
are that authorities, particularly more distant and centralised authorities, do not 
respond to requests and are so powerful that their actions cannot be questioned, 
then people are unlikely to consider claiming accountability. In our conflict 
locations people expect little from higher authorities, and actively avoid them at 
times (particularly security actors). That does not mean they do not at times 
collectivise to resist. One way of thinking about this is where there might be a 
social contract of some kind in place, which is a way of saying that people 
expect certain things of authorities in exchange for something else (compliance 
with rules, allowing authorities to have a degree of decision-making power…). 
We have some evidence that where money is involved more questions are 
asked or more expectations are in place. But often financial exchanges are at a 
 
53  One of the five pillars of Islam, it is a percentage of a person’s total wealth to be given to the poor as 
almsgiving. In Pakistan the state collects 2.5 per cent of a person’s cash and bank balance and 
distributes it through the Zakat and Ushr Departments in each province. 
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very local level, not with these further away authorities. There is perhaps more 
thinking to do about moral obligations that people perceive, which are different 
from this understanding of contracts. Interestingly, in Pakistan the reflection is 
that intermediaries have a greater sense of the obligations on authorities than 
households did in our initial phase. 
It’s not the people who need us, it’s the other way round. 
The dependency relation between poor households and intermediaries is not 
one-sided and both sides know it. It is visible in this quote from Doctor when he 
was explaining the link between patronage and legitimacy. Intermediaries 
constantly make themselves important: they are always on the phone either with 
people from their location or with public authorities, they are always receiving 
visitors, they regularly update their social media profiles either to inform people of 
their activities or to demand rights from the state on people’s behalf. Yet for most 
of them, their importance and legitimacy in the eyes of public authorities is 
directly linked to who and how many people they claim to represent – their 
collectivisation power. That power though, is dependent on people’s willingness 
to be mobilised by particular intermediaries and by how much the people trust 
them. Legitimacy then comes from the give-and-take relation intermediaries 
sustain with people. People expect something from intermediaries; if they do not 
give them anything, they lose legitimacy. The minimum they can give is 
information and justification about their own actions: answerability. 
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Figure A1. Episode A: Fighting for the right to land 
in rural Punjab 
 
Source: Authors’ own 
In January 2020 in the Punjab conflict location, the conflict between allottees and 
villagers grew up once again pertaining to land use. One allottee, a retired army 
brigadier, tied up a few sharecroppers who he claimed did not pay him full 
theka54 and hurled abuses at the village women. The sharecroppers felt that the 
theka he was asking for was against the pact signed between them because an 
increase was not due until the end of 2021. This was when all the intermediaries 
of the conflict village and other influential people started to plan how to get the 
land back from the allottee. They strongly believed that if they did nothing, next 
time any one of them could be the target of the wrath of the allottees. They sat at 
the bethak and planned how to do it in order to regain possession of the land. 
Part of the plan was to spread the message and mobilise others from 
neighbouring villages as well. It was then decided that after morning prayers they 
would take six tractors and all the available labour to the site so that they could 
sow the land and legally make it their own. It is accepted as customary law that 
once someone sows a field, then the harvest of that field is theirs and they have 
the legal share in that land during that period. 
 
54  Land lease contract. 
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While in the men’s space the men were planning and discussing strategies, in 
the female section Aapa was using social media to convey her message to the 
concerned authorities: if any use of force against these peaceful people was to 
be taken, they should prepare themselves for a repeat of the protests that 
happened around 2003.55 She told them in a video message that the memories 
of those days had not faded and would be easily refreshed. 
The next morning around 200–300 people went to the allottee’s land. Amir 
believes that such an empowering scene had not been seen in his village for a 
long time. He said initially he did not expect such a massive turnout, but because 
there were so many of them, they managed to achieve their target of sowing the 
whole plot by 8am. They successfully and peacefully claimed the land back into 
their possession. Neither the allottee nor any of his staff members came out to 
confront them. 
Figure A2. Episode B: Fighting the police 
Source: Authors’ own 
In early 2020, an influential allottee (a retired army officer) accused some local 
poor sharecroppers of not paying theka on time and, using his influence with the 
police, launched a FIR56 against them. Meanwhile the sharecroppers complained 
that he had increased the rate of theka and that therefore he was at fault and 
referred the case to Doctor. Doctor then asked Nawaz to join him on his visit to 
the police station so that they both could talk to the DSP. His rationale was that 
two equally influential people would make more of an impression than one. 
 
55  The beginning of the clashes between peasants and the army and the birth of the peasants’ movement, 
the tenants’ association. 
56  First Information Report, the first document the police prepare to start criminal procedures. 
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While there, the DSP made them wait outside for quite some time, despite 
having sitting capacity inside the station. After a couple of hours, Doctor walked 
in through the DSP’s office demanding to know not only why he was not meeting 
them but also why they were not allowed to sit inside in his office or waiting 
room. The DSP replied, ‘It’s my office and I do whatever I want to do’. Doctor 
said, ‘Well, it is a public office and you’re supposed to serve us at any cost’. The 
DSP stood up and shouted at them to get out of his office immediately. Both 
Nawaz and Doctor shouted back at the DSP and a physical fight broke out 
between the three of them along with abuses from both sides. The DSP’s team 
quickly intervened: they arrested both Nawaz and Doctor on the DSP’s orders 
and launched a FIR against the two. 
As Doctor and Nawaz were there initially to voice the demands of the poor 
sharecroppers, some of these sharecroppers were outside the police station 
when the incident happened. The sharecroppers went out and spread the word 
with the people of their respective villages and in the constituencies of both 
Nawaz and Doctor. Within a few hours, many people gathered outside the police 
station and blocked the main road of the city – they even blocked the roads 
outside the military cantonment. People stood there the whole day and even 
blocked the roads for 2–3 days, chanting slogans ‘DSP kutta haye haye!’ (the 
DSP is a dog). The situation was so volatile that the security agencies and army 
officers had to intervene in order to pacify the matter and resolve it amicably. 
This is very unusual in the area for security agencies to get involved in resolving 
civilian issues with the police. Doctor and Nawaz eventually got bail, but also 
because of their connections in mainstream politics. The DSP eventually even 
had to apologise to Nawaz and Doctor. ‘At the end of the day’, Nawaz said, ‘the 
power of the public and the power of mobilising people works.’ 
In November 2019, Jon, a retired employee of CDA and one of our 
intermediaries in Islamabad, tried to make a janazgah because there was no 
place in the location to perform the last rites before burial. He did so by raising a 
compound wall around a vacant piece of land. While Jon was doing this, the 
CDA’s director and a magistrate came by. They asked Jon what his intentions 
were, and how dared he build something without permission. Jon told them they 
were making a janazgah in an empty plot of land and that he did not wish to own 
the land; he was not part of a qabza group.57 It was not for any individual, but for 
the whole community and not for profit. Jon told them that CDA could take the 
land back whenever it wanted to, trying to make sure he did not antagonise the 
CDA officials. The CDA officials told him to stop raising the compound wall and 
asked for his name and his ID card. Although Jon had his ID card with him, he 
told them he did not have it: he is a retired CDA employee, and he knew that 
they could use that information to lodge a criminal case against him. 
 
57  A group of people illegally possessing property through fraud, intimidation, or assault. 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 550 

















Source: Authors’ own 
As the director left for his office, two CDA officials who recognised Jon stayed a 
bit longer and told him to go after the director to apologise. Jon and two people 
from the abadi went to the director’s office to tell him again that they did not have 
any ill intentions. The CDA director did not utter a word and told them to go back 
home. As they were leaving, one of the director’s office staff told Jon that it had 
been a good idea to come and talk to the director, otherwise he would have 
registered a FIR against him. While an employee of CDA, Jon was an active 
member of the CDA labour union and created his network amongst officials 
close to his rank, which explains why so many people within CDA were advising 
him what to do. When Jon came back to the abadi, he asked the residents to 
protest against the CDA action as the empty plot was within the settlement. ‘We 
do not have a janazgah’, he said, ‘We should claim this land!’ Yet, nobody 
supported him, so he had to stop the construction of the janazgah. 
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Figure A4. Episode D: Evictions under Covid-19 
lockdown in Islamabad 
Source: Authors’ own 
Even during the start of the Covid-19 pandemic the government used its force to 
frighten people living in katchi abadis in the capital. During the pandemic’s earlier 
months, some CDA officials used to come to poor neighbourhoods and 
confiscate all the possessions of people working as informal vendors in the 
workshops in front or adjacent to the main roads of the city. A key incident 
happened in April 2020, when the CDA demolished 75 huts in a katchi abadi 
without any legal notice. As the demolition was taking place, workers from the 
left-wing party reached the spot and started taking pictures, making videos, and 
posting them on different social media platforms. They particularly used Twitter, 
tagging the Human Rights Minister’s account as well as the Minister’s children’s 
Twitter accounts. The Minister soon responded saying they were not aware of 
the eviction operation by the CDA and that they would do what they could in their 
power to call it off. 
The operation was stopped within a day. Later that night, a police van came to 
distribute food among the people who were stranded under the open sky. It was 
a goodwill gesture from the Minister’s side: to send quick support through the 
respective local MNA. Talha, who was part of the social campaign, stated that 
the police officials were unable to identify who needed their limited support the 
most. Therefore, the intermediaries belonging to the left-wing party volunteered 
to help the police officials with identifying the poorest of the poor to give 
assistance to. These party workers and the police rarely work together; in fact, 
often the interaction is of the police arresting left-wing party workers. Yet, 
besides that initial supply of food, the state did nothing else. The left-wing party’s 
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intermediaries had to buy plastic sheets and tarpaulins so that the people who 
were left without shelter could be saved from the heavy rain that followed in the 
next two days. 
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